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OPTIMJACK: 178 Enterprise Websites Including Zoom, BBC, and Equifax Served Card Skimmer and iOS Exploits via Compromised Optimizely Platform

Attackers with write access to Optimizely’s platform injected a multi-purpose JavaScript kit — OPTIMJACK — into the shared Project JavaScript feature used by 178 enterprise websites. Within hours, Zoom, BBC, CNN, HSBC, Equifax, and over 170 other organisations were serving card skimmers, crypto swappers, and iOS exploit chains to their own visitors without being directly compromised. The initial access vector remains unknown. The attacker was still inside hours after cleanup began.

DataWater Threat Intelligence Desk | Published November 17, 2026 | 8-minute read

Threat level: Critical (active)

What: OPTIMJACK — a supply-chain attack on Optimizely Web’s shared Project JavaScript feature. Attackers injected a multi-stage JavaScript loader that delivered a credit-card skimmer, a cryptocurrency wallet-address swapper, session-token and screenshot harvesting, and iOS exploit chains (Coruna and DarkSword) to visitors of 178 enterprise websites.

Status: Active as of reporting. Malicious code appeared in Optimizely’s own login.optimizely.com snippets (single-source: Report URI), confirming attacker access beyond individual customer accounts. At least one organisation, Smartsheet, was re-infected after removing the malicious code — the attacker had not been ejected by time of initial reporting. Optimizely had not issued a public statement.

Deadline: No CISA deadline. All organisations using Optimizely Web should treat Project JavaScript as a potential compromise vector and audit it now. Any customer with active checkout flows on November 16 should assume card and crypto data was exposed and begin PCI-DSS notification assessment immediately.

Fix: Audit and purge unauthorised code from every Optimizely Project JavaScript field. Rotate all Optimizely user credentials and API tokens. Enforce a strict Content Security Policy that blocks unknown script origins and bans unsafe-eval. Update iPhones to iOS 18.7.3 or iOS 26.3 or later. Notify users of potential payment card exposure on November 16.

Key takeaways

  • OPTIMJACK compromised Optimizely’s platform, not just individual customer accounts. Malicious code appeared in snippets served by Optimizely’s own login.optimizely.com (single-source: Report URI), ruling out a customer-only account takeover as the sole vector. No CDN cache poisoning was found.
  • 178 enterprise websites were affected simultaneously, including Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, and Ledger. Smartsheet was re-infected after cleanup, confirming the attacker retained write access hours into the incident.
  • The iOS exploit kit deployed is unusually sophisticated. Coruna (iOS 13–17) contains 23 exploits across five full exploit chains, per Google’s Threat Intelligence Group. DarkSword (iOS 18.4–18.7) links six vulnerabilities. This capability is not typical of commodity skimming crews.
  • Approximately $7,040 in cryptocurrency was confirmed stolen within nine hours. The card skimmer posted data to 1688360[.]cc/card[.]php. Payment cards entered into non-iframe checkout flows on affected sites on November 16 should be treated as compromised.
  • Optimizely had not responded to researchers or issued a public statement as of this writing. Every Optimizely customer must assume their tenant was affected until they verify their own audit logs.

Executive Summary

Yesterday, some of the world’s most recognisable websites served malware to their own visitors — not because those websites were hacked individually, but because Optimizely was.

Optimizely Web is a leading A/B testing and personalisation platform used by thousands of enterprises. Its Project JavaScript feature allows customers to inject custom JavaScript onto their websites through Optimizely’s shared infrastructure. On November 16, 2026, attackers with apparent write access to that infrastructure replaced legitimate snippets with a malicious loader. Because the injection ran inside Optimizely’s platform, it ran simultaneously on every website that loaded it — without those websites being individually breached.

Security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI discovered the campaign and named it OPTIMJACK. By 13:43 UTC, a card skimmer had been added to the loader. By 19:25 UTC, attacker wallets had already received about $7,040 in cryptocurrency. By 20:56 UTC, 169 snippets were still infected. By 21:52 UTC, only TalkTalk’s remained live — but Smartsheet was later re-infected, indicating the attacker had not been fully ejected from the platform. The malicious code also appeared in snippets for Optimizely’s own sites, including login.optimizely.com (single-source: Report URI), which no customer could have caused.

The attacker deployed three distinct payloads in a single loader fetching track.js from 1688360[.]cc: a cryptocurrency wallet-address swapper covering Bitcoin, Ethereum, Solana, TRON, Litecoin, and Dogecoin; a Luhn-validated card skimmer exfiltrating data to 1688360[.]cc/card[.]php via navigator.sendBeacon(); and a device-fingerprinting and iOS exploit delivery system. Devices on iOS 13 through 17 received Coruna, which Google’s Threat Intelligence Group says contains 23 exploits across five full chains. Devices on iOS 18.4 to 18.7 received DarkSword, which links six vulnerabilities. iOS 26 devices saw fingerprinting only, suggesting the attacker has limited coverage for the newest release.

As of this briefing: Optimizely has not issued a public statement. The initial access method has not been disclosed. At least one organisation was re-infected after cleanup. If your enterprise uses Optimizely Web, your Project JavaScript has not been verified clean until you check it yourself.

This is not the first time a third-party script platform has been weaponised against enterprise websites at scale. Russia’s APT29 compromised analytics provider Plerdy to push zero-click iOS and Android exploits to thousands of sites — and that CISA deadline is tomorrow, November 18. Yesterday’s Fireworks AI breach showed the same supply-chain logic applied to a developer tooling platform. OPTIMJACK is the third supply-chain incident in four days covered by this desk, and it is the largest by victim count.

Why This Matters to CISOs and Security Leaders

Your vendor’s shared feature surface is your attack surface. Optimizely Project JavaScript is intentionally designed to run code on every page of every customer’s website. That is why it was targeted. The attacker didn’t need to breach 178 companies — they needed to breach one platform. The same logic applies to every personalisation script, A/B testing tool, analytics tag manager, and customer data platform your organisation loads from a third party.

The iOS exploit kit raises the threat actor’s profile. Coruna (23 exploits across five chains, iOS 13–17) and DarkSword (six vulnerabilities, iOS 18.4–18.7) are not commodity tools. Attribution has not been confirmed publicly, but iOS exploit kits at this level of completeness are historically associated with nation-state actors or well-funded criminal groups who source or develop zero-click iOS exploits. Finding this capability bundled with a card skimmer is unusual and suggests either a sophisticated actor or the dark-market purchase of a high-end mobile exploit kit.

The re-infection confirms active, unresolved access. Smartsheet cleaned its snippet and was infected again. The attacker retained write credentials or platform-level session access hours after the incident went public. If Optimizely has not revoked that access, any organisation that patches and moves on without rotating all Optimizely credentials may be patching the wrong thing.

Executive insight

Ask your digital marketing and security teams this question today: “Which third-party JavaScript platforms have write access to code running on our websites, and when did we last audit what they are serving?” Optimizely, Google Tag Manager, Segment, Contentsquare, Hotjar, and similar tools all load JavaScript that your WAF and EDR cannot inspect, and that your users implicitly trust. If you don’t have a current inventory of these platforms and a process for monitoring their output at runtime, you are relying entirely on vendor security you cannot verify.

The Timeline

Time (UTC, Nov 16, 2026) What happened
~13:03 Stolen cryptocurrency moved to exchanges — first observed attacker crypto movement
13:43 Payment card skimmer added to the OPTIMJACK loader in Optimizely Project JavaScript
~19:25 Attacker wallets confirmed to have received approximately $7,040 in cryptocurrency
~20:56 169 of approximately 178 Optimizely snippet fields still serving malicious code
21:52 TalkTalk’s snippet was the last confirmed active infection at researcher’s final check
Post-cleanup Smartsheet re-infected after removing malicious code, confirming attacker retained write access to Optimizely’s platform after the incident became public
Nov 17, early Optimizely had not issued a public statement; initial access method still unknown

The attacker didn’t hack 178 companies. They hacked the platform that serves code to all of them — and they were still inside hours after cleanup began.

Attack Chain Analysis

Stage Technique Control to block it
Initial access Compromise of Optimizely’s platform with write access to Project JavaScript (method unknown; CDN cache poisoning ruled out). Malicious code in Optimizely’s own login.optimizely.com snippet (single-source) suggests platform-level access, not client-only account takeover. Enforce MFA and IP-restricted API access on all Optimizely accounts; monitor snippet change logs via Optimizely’s audit trail or REST API
Persistence Malicious loader persisted in Project JavaScript fields across 178 customer projects. Re-infection of Smartsheet post-cleanup confirms the attacker retained valid credential or session access into the evening of November 16. Rotate all Optimizely credentials immediately; revoke and re-issue API tokens; review all OAuth and SSO integrations connected to Optimizely
Payload delivery OPTIMJACK loader fetched track.js from 1688360[.]cc using plain references, Base64 decoding with atob(), and inline eval() — techniques that bypass simple keyword filters. Delivery required no user interaction beyond page load. Strict Content Security Policy blocking unknown script sources; remove unsafe-eval and strict-dynamic from CSP; use Subresource Integrity hashes on third-party scripts
Card and credential theft Luhn-validated card skimmer exfiltrated payment card numbers, expiry dates, and CVVs from checkout forms to 1688360[.]cc/card[.]php via sendBeacon(). Cookie harvesting and html2canvas page screenshots collected session tokens and page state. Isolate payment iframes on a separate origin so parent-window JavaScript cannot access them; monitor outbound beacon calls for unknown domains
Cryptocurrency theft Wallet-address swapper silently replaced user-typed addresses for Bitcoin, Ethereum, TRON, Solana, Litecoin, and Dogecoin. Browser extension wallets and clipboard-based flows were both targeted. Educate users to verify wallet addresses after pasting; hardware wallets are unaffected by DOM and clipboard-based swappers
iOS device exploitation Coruna (iOS 13–17; 23 exploits across five full chains, per Google GTIG) and DarkSword (iOS 18.4–18.7; six linked vulnerabilities) pushed silently to mobile visitors. iOS 26 devices received fingerprinting only. Update all corporate iOS devices to iOS 18.7.3 or iOS 26.3+ via MDM; enforce minimum iOS version policy
What nobody is talking about
The re-infection of Smartsheet is the story inside the story. When a customer removes malicious code from their Optimizely snippet and finds it replaced hours later, that is not a stale cache or a timing coincidence — it means the attacker still had live write credentials or a valid session on Optimizely’s platform after the incident went public. That means Optimizely had not revoked the attacker’s access, rotated compromised credentials, or invalidated active sessions by the time researchers stopped watching. Every organisation that cleaned its snippet and went to sleep assuming the incident was resolved may still be running attacker code today.

Threat Intelligence Breakdown

Campaign name: OPTIMJACK (named by researchers). No formal attribution to a specific threat actor as of this briefing.

Sophistication assessment: High. The combination of a platform-level compromise at Optimizely, multi-stage obfuscated delivery, iOS exploit chains capable of full device exploitation on five attack paths (Coruna, iOS 13–17) and six linked vulnerabilities (DarkSword, iOS 18.x), confirmed active re-infection after partial cleanup, and simultaneous targeting of card data, cryptocurrency, session tokens, and mobile devices suggests a well-resourced actor. Card-skimming campaigns at this scale have historically been associated with Magecart-affiliated criminal groups, but iOS exploit chains at this level are more consistent with nation-state tools or acquisition of a commercial mobile exploit kit.

What is unknown: The initial access method into Optimizely’s platform. The number of card records exfiltrated (the $7,040 in crypto is confirmed but quantifies only the wallet-swap portion). Whether Optimizely’s customer credential store was also accessed. Whether the attacker deployed OPTIMJACK on other platforms. The full list of affected organisations (178 is the researcher’s count at a point in time).

Indicators of compromise (from Report URI analysis and CyberSecurityNews, defanged):

Type Indicator Context
Domain 1688360[.]cc Primary attacker infrastructure; script delivery and exfiltration endpoint
URL 1688360[.]cc/track[.]js Malicious loader script fetched by OPTIMJACK from Optimizely fields
URL 1688360[.]cc/card[.]php Card exfiltration endpoint receiving skimmed payment data via sendBeacon()
Code pattern atob( combined with eval( in Optimizely snippet Obfuscation pattern used to bypass keyword filters; not expected in legitimate Optimizely configuration
Change log entry Unexpected edits to Optimizely Project JavaScript on November 16, 2026 Use Optimizely’s audit log or REST API to identify when changes were made and from which account or token

Enterprise Impact

Payment card data: Any card entered into a non-iframe checkout form on an affected website between approximately 13:43 UTC and site-specific cleanup time on November 16 should be treated as compromised. Cards entered through payment iframes hosted on a separate origin were out of reach of the skimmer. If your organisation’s website ran Optimizely and had checkout flows active on November 16, begin your PCI-DSS breach notification assessment now — do not wait for Optimizely’s statement.

Cryptocurrency transactions: Any cryptocurrency transfer initiated from a browser session that loaded OPTIMJACK had its destination wallet address silently replaced. If you completed a crypto transfer on or through one of the 178 affected sites on November 16, verify the destination address against your wallet provider’s records. Approximately $7,040 in confirmed cryptocurrency theft was identified by researchers within nine hours of card-skimmer deployment.

Session and credential exposure: OPTIMJACK harvested cookies that were not flagged HttpOnly, as well as html2canvas page screenshots. Any authenticated session on an affected site on November 16 should be treated as potentially captured. Users should be advised to log out and re-authenticate.

iOS device compromise: Any iPhone running iOS 13 through 17 that visited an affected site on November 16 may have had the Coruna exploit chain delivered silently. Any device on iOS 18.4 to 18.7 may have received DarkSword. Update iOS and treat the device as potentially compromised if it was on an older version. Corporate MDM policies enforcing a minimum iOS version would have mitigated this for managed devices.

Regulatory and notification exposure: Organisations in finance, travel, and healthcare among the 178 affected — particularly HSBC, Equifax, and Air France-KLM — may face notification obligations under PCI-DSS, GDPR, or sector-specific rules if card data or personal data was exposed. The fact that the attack originated from a third-party platform does not remove the first-party notification obligation.

What Security Leaders Should Do Next

Today

  1. Audit every Optimizely Project JavaScript field. Check the Optimizely audit log and REST API change history for November 16. Look for any reference to 1688360[.]cc, any atob() or eval() calls that your team did not place, and any changes made from accounts or API tokens you do not recognise. Remove all suspect code and preserve a copy for forensics.
  2. Revoke and rotate all Optimizely credentials. Every user account, API token, OAuth integration, and SSO session tied to your Optimizely organisation should be revoked and re-issued. The re-infection of Smartsheet demonstrates the attacker retained write access hours after the incident began; rotating credentials is not optional.
  3. Begin PCI-DSS notification assessment if checkout flows were active on November 16. If your site loaded Optimizely and users entered card data into non-iframe forms that day, your window for notification assessment has begun. Document when you found it, what your audit logs showed, and when you took action.
  4. Push emergency iOS updates to corporate devices. Any managed device running iOS 13–17 or iOS 18.4–18.7 should be updated to iOS 18.7.3 or iOS 26.3+ via MDM immediately. Notify employees using personal devices that they should update urgently if they visited any of the named organisations’ websites on November 16.

Within 48 hours

  1. Block 1688360[.]cc at DNS and proxy. Blocking this domain and alerting on any outbound traffic to it may identify infected surfaces not yet discovered. It is also a residual risk if any device loaded the skimmer before it was removed from Optimizely.
  2. Inventory all third-party JavaScript on your websites. Produce a full list of every vendor that runs JavaScript on your sites, the access mechanism each uses, and who within your organisation reviews changes. Prioritise platforms — tag managers, personalisation tools, analytics scripts — that have write access to your site’s global JavaScript context.
  3. Implement or strengthen your Content Security Policy. Sites with restrictive CSPs that blocked eval() and unknown script origins were significantly less exposed. Add a CSP that explicitly allows only known script sources; remove unsafe-eval and strict-dynamic; test against OPTIMJACK’s known delivery patterns before deploying to production.
  4. Contact Optimizely directly for confirmation of remediation status. Ask whether the access vector has been closed, whether your tenant’s audit logs show unauthorised changes, and whether any customer credential data was accessed on Optimizely’s platform.

Long-term

  1. Build real-time integrity monitoring for third-party script content. Services that hash third-party script outputs and alert on unexpected changes — such as Report URI’s tooling, which discovered OPTIMJACK — can detect supply-chain injections within seconds instead of hours. The November 16 incident ran for at least eight hours before broad cleanup began.
  2. Isolate all checkout flows from third-party JavaScript. Payment forms should load on a separate domain or in a sandboxed iframe that restricts parent-window JavaScript access. This eliminates card-skimmer risk regardless of which third-party platform is compromised upstream.
  3. Add marketing and personalisation SaaS platforms to your vendor risk programme. Personalisation, A/B testing, and analytics tools are code-execution platforms for your website, not passive data collection services. Apply MFA requirements, access reviews, change monitoring, and a formal offboarding process to every vendor with write access to your website’s JavaScript layer. The SCKit attack on ScreenConnect and OPTIMJACK share the same root cause: a trusted platform leveraged as a code-delivery channel.

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Winners and Losers

Better positioned More exposed
Sites with strict Content Security Policies that blocked eval() and unknown script origins Sites running unsafe-eval in their CSP, or no CSP at all
Payment flows isolated in separate-origin iframes (Stripe, Adyen, Braintree hosted checkout pages) Sites handling card entry in first-party DOM while also loading Optimizely Project JavaScript
Users on iOS 18.7.3 or iOS 26.3+, unaffected by Coruna and DarkSword payloads iOS 13–17 users who visited any of 178 affected sites on November 16 — full exploit chain delivery possible
Organisations already monitoring third-party script hash changes via Report URI, SRI, or equivalent Organisations with no visibility into what their third-party vendors serve at runtime
Crypto users on hardware wallets (browser-based address swapper cannot intercept hardware-confirmed transactions) Crypto users who transacted in browser on an affected site on November 16
Companies that already have Optimizely scoped into their vendor risk programme with change alerting Companies treating Optimizely as a marketing tool outside the security team’s review process

Final Executive Takeaway

OPTIMJACK is proof that your security perimeter now extends to every platform that writes code to your website.

Optimizely Project JavaScript is a legitimate, documented feature. The attack did not require a vulnerability in any website — it required write access to a shared platform that every customer website implicitly trusted. Zoom did not get hacked. BBC did not get hacked. Equifax did not get hacked. The platform they all trusted got hacked, and that platform served malicious code to their visitors on their behalf.

The same attack model could target any tag manager, analytics platform, personalisation tool, chat widget, or marketing script that runs JavaScript on enterprise websites. If you do not know which platforms have write access to code running on your sites, and if you do not monitor what that code does at runtime, you have exactly the same exposure as the 178 organisations named in this briefing.

Audit Optimizely now. Rotate all credentials. Isolate checkout flows. Enforce CSP. And then build the broader inventory of who else can write code to your website without your knowledge.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is OPTIMJACK and how did the Optimizely supply chain attack work?

OPTIMJACK is the name researchers gave to a supply-chain attack discovered on November 16, 2026, in which attackers with write access to Optimizely’s platform injected malicious JavaScript into the Project JavaScript feature used by enterprise customers. Because this feature delivers JavaScript through Optimizely’s shared infrastructure, every website that loaded it simultaneously served a card skimmer, a cryptocurrency wallet-address swapper, session-token harvesting code, and iOS exploit chains to their visitors — without those websites being individually compromised.

Which companies were affected by the OPTIMJACK Optimizely attack?

The OPTIMJACK Optimizely attack affected 178 organisations, according to researcher Scott Helme of Report URI. Named organisations include Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger, Peacock, Smartsheet, Scheels, Vodafone Australia, and TalkTalk. TalkTalk was the last organisation confirmed still infected at 21:52 UTC on November 16. Smartsheet was re-infected after removing its malicious snippet, indicating the attacker retained write access to the Optimizely platform into the evening.

Was my credit card stolen if I shopped at an affected website on November 16?

Any credit card entered into a non-iframe checkout form on one of the 178 affected websites between approximately 13:43 UTC and that site’s specific cleanup time on November 16, 2026, may have been captured by the OPTIMJACK card skimmer and sent to 1688360[.]cc. Payment forms isolated in separate-origin iframes were protected. If you made a card payment on an affected site on that date, treat the card as potentially compromised, monitor your statements, and consider requesting a replacement.

What should enterprises do if they use Optimizely Web?

Enterprises using Optimizely Web should immediately audit every Project JavaScript field and experiment custom-code field for any reference to 1688360[.]cc or patterns using atob() combined with eval() that were not placed by their own team. Use the Optimizely audit log and REST API change history to identify any changes made on November 16. Revoke and rotate all Optimizely user accounts, API tokens, and OAuth integrations. If checkout flows were active on affected pages on November 16, begin a PCI-DSS notification assessment and do not wait for Optimizely’s statement before doing so.

What are Coruna and DarkSword in the OPTIMJACK Optimizely attack?

Coruna and DarkSword are iOS exploit chains embedded in the OPTIMJACK payload. According to Google’s Threat Intelligence Group, Coruna targets iOS 13 through 17 with 23 exploits across five full exploit chains, enabling potential full device compromise. DarkSword targets iOS 18.4 to 18.7 with six linked vulnerabilities. iPhones on iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, received fingerprinting activity only and were not served the exploit chains. Any iPhone on an older version that visited an affected site on November 16 should be updated and may have been compromised.

How did the attacker gain access to Optimizely’s platform for OPTIMJACK?

The initial access method for OPTIMJACK has not been disclosed as of this briefing. Researcher Scott Helme of Report URI explicitly ruled out CDN cache poisoning. The appearance of malicious code in snippets served from Optimizely’s own login.optimizely.com (single-source: Report URI) indicates the attacker had write access to Optimizely’s platform itself, not merely individual customer accounts. Optimizely had not issued a public statement or responded to Report URI by the time this briefing was written.

Does OPTIMJACK have a CVE number?

No CVE identifier has been assigned to OPTIMJACK or the Optimizely platform compromise as of this briefing, because no specific software vulnerability has been publicly identified as the initial entry point. The iOS exploit chains Coruna and DarkSword involve multiple underlying vulnerabilities in iOS, but researchers have not published the individual CVE identifiers for the components used. This briefing will be updated when CVE assignments or additional Optimizely disclosures become available.

Sources

Primary sources: CyberSecurityNews, “Hackers Infect 178 Major Websites via Optimizely” (November 16–17, 2026); GBHackers, “Hackers Inject Malware Into 178 Major Brands’ Websites via Optimizely” (November 16–17, 2026); SecurityOnline, “OPTIMJACK Optimizely Malware Hits 178 Brands” (November 2026); The CyberSec Guru, “Anatomy of OPTIMJACK” (November 2026). Additional coverage reviewed: GBHackers, CoinCentral, OutlookIndia, CoinPedia, DealRoom.co. IoC data via Report URI / Scott Helme, as reported by CyberSecurityNews. Reflects public reporting as of November 17, 2026.

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